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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
mature" recordation is "at worst, a relative nullity. . .cured"3' by the
defendant's failure to appeal suspensively. The use of City Electric
as a precedent was particularly surprising since that case was not
concerned with recordation of a judgment but rather dealt with the
filing of a garnishment petition, clearly a step taken in execution of
the judgment. 7
Thus, the court in Hillebrandt came full circle in its analysis that
had begun by treating substantive Civil Code rights differently from
Code of Civil Procedure rules involving execution. By distinguishing
the previous cases on their facts and by relying upon City Electric,
the court fell into the trap of looking to the procedural rule for judg-
ment execution, rather than the articles of the Civil Code creating
mortgage rights which are the proper tools for the resolution of the
issue.
In the important area of property rights, the great need for cer-
tainty can best be fulfilled by a return to the Chaffe court's interpre-
tation of the legislative intent. The recordation of a judicial mortgage
is not an act in execution of the judgment; rather, recordation estab-
lishes a substantive right granted by the Civil Code that should re-
main in effect unless cancellation is warranted by a reversal of the
judgment. 8 The debtor is amply protected because there can be no
seizure and sale of his property until the judgment becomes final and
executory. Accordingly, recordation should be considered effective if
accomplished at any time following the trial court's rendition of judg-
ment, regardless of whether an appeal is taken.
Stephen K. Peters
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND THE REQUISITES OF JUSTICIABILITY IN LOUISIANA
COURTS
The concept of justiciability has traditionally been thought to
36. Associates Financial Serv. Co. v. Hillebrandt, 250 So. 2d 75, 79 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
37. Kimber-Murphy Mfg. Co. v. Vestal, Inc., 43 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949)
also blurred the distinction between recordation and execution of a judgment in dicta
which incorrectly analogized a premature seizure by a judgment creditor, truly an act
in execution of the judgment, to recordation of a non-executory judgment. The
Hillebrandt court disposed of Kimber-Murphy as well as Charlton, Cluseau and Denny
as involving "execution of judgments, with which we are not concerned herein." 250
So. 2d at 79.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3381 provides for erasure of the inscription of a judgment
which is later reversed on appeal.
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embody two separate but closely related requirements. One, address-
ing the nature and form of the controversy, is that the case be appro-
priate for judicial resolution. Accordingly, courts have generally re-
quired that parties be adverse and that the case present genuine
issues concerning actual questions of law.' The other requirement
arises out of the doctrine of separation of powers and prohibits courts
from sitting as forums for controversies that are constitutionally allo-
cated to the other branches of government.2
The rendition of an advisory opinion trenches upon both of these
requirements. First, the matter before the court may not be suffi-
ciently concrete for adjudication.3 Further, an advisory opinion ad-
dresses issues in advance of a dispute and declares what the law will
be in the future, thereby usurping a legislative function.4
1. See Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. State, 295 So. 2d 796, 801
(La. 1974); Petition of Sewerage and Water Bd., 248 La. 169, 175, 177 So. 2d 276, 278
(1965); State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 955, 84 So. 2d 597, 600 (1955). The
requirement of truly adverse parties, however, is not a universal rule. See LA. CODE
Civ. P. arts. 2881 and 3031 authorizing non-adversary proceedings in matters of pro-
bate jurisdiction under express authority granted in La. Const. art. VII, § 35 (1921).
2. See First Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. Ann. 538, 543 (1847): "The judicial
action is put forth in favor of absolute, positive legal rights . . . [which] must be
separated by a distinct line of demarcation from those which are subject to the action
of other branches of government, the interference of which must be avoided." See also
State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948); Durrett Hdwe & Fum. Co. v. City
of Monroe, 199 La. 329, 5 So. 2d 911 (1942); State ex rel. Cruse v. LaSalle Parish School
Bd., 35 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); State ex rel. Pleasant v. Hardy, 157 So.
130 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
3. Louisiana courts have long looked with disfavor upon rendition of advisory
opinions. At no time was this inclination more evident than shortly after the passage
of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1871-83. One
disputed issue was whether the act authorized the judiciary to render opinions on
hypothetical or academic questions which previously would have been deemed too
abstract for judicial resolution. In State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 955, 84
So. 2d 597, 599 (1955), the Louisiana supreme court stated: "The Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act has not the magical effect of changing the . . . basic tenants [of
justiciability]. In truth, to contrive the statute as extending jurisdiction to the courts
to validate legislative actions or otherwise render advisory opinions would effect an
unconstitutional enlargement of the grant of judicial power which is restricted to real
controversies." See also Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971); Stoddard
v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So. 2d 9 (1964); Orleans Parish School Bd. v.
City of New Orleans, 238 La. 748, 116 So. 2d 509 (1959); Graham v. Congregation of
St. Rita Roman Catholic Church, 146 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Guerriero
v. City of Monroe, 136 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
4. See Stoddard v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So. 2d 9 (1964); State
v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So. 2d 597 (1955). See also In re Gulf Oxygen
Welders' Supply Profit Sharing Plan & Trust Agreement, 297 So. 2d 663, 672 (La. 1974)
(Summers, J., dissenting).
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The Louisiana supreme court, in In re Gulf Oxygen Welders'
Supply Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement,' recently reeval-
uated these concepts of justiciability, and may have forged a new and
different pattern for future adjudication. The trustee of a profit shar-
ing trust applied to the district court, under authority granted in the
trust code,6 for an interpretation of his responsibilities under the trust
instrument. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that
the statute authorizing the trustee's application unconstitutionally
required the court to render an advisory opinion. On appeal, the
supreme court reversed, holding that the statute in question did not
require actions prohibited by the Louisiana constitution of 1921.
Before In re Gulf, Louisiana courts had taken the position that
"[clourts of justice are to decide real contests; they are never to be
used as instruments to work injustice, wound the feelings or affect the
interests of others, through the intervention of fictitious or uninter-
ested parties."7 In establishing the requisites for such "real contests,"
the courts had insisted that cases present issues which were not moot,
abstract, or hypothetical' and that no issues be judicially considered
before they had materialized.' Accordingly, advisory opinions were
forbidden as contrary to traditional notions of justiciability"0 and as
violative of provisions of the 1921 constitution which were interpreted
by the courts as incorporating the prohibition against rendition of
advisory opinions."
5. 297 So. 2d 663 (La. 1974).
6. The trust code provision under consideration was LA. R. S. 9:2233(B) (Supp.
1964) which provides: "A trustee may apply for instructions in ex parte proceedings.
The order issued therein will protect a third party relying on the order, but will not
exonerate a trustee from liability to a settlor or beneficiary."
7. Livingston v. D'Orgenoy, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 87, 95 (La. 1810). See also Duffy v.
City of New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 114, 21 So. 179 (1896); State ex rel. Howard v.
Burbank, 22 La. Ann. 298 (1870).
8. See Aucoin v. Dunn, 255 La. 823, 233 So. 2d 530 (1970); State v. Board of
Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So. 2d 597 (1955); Jung v. Gwin, 174 La. 111, 139 So. 774
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 561 (1932); State ex rel. Howard v. Burbank, 22 La. Ann. 298
(1870); Highland Lumber & Supply Co. v. Young, 38 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949); Ramsey v. Fontenot, 36 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948); City of Alexandria
v. Wilks, 18 So. 2d 341 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
9. Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971); State v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 228 La. 951, 84 So. 2d 597 (1955); Tugwell v. Members of Bd. of Hwys., 228 La.
662, 83 So. 2d 893 (1955); Kelley v. Kelley, 185 La. 185, 168 So. 769 (1936); Duffy v.
City of New Orleans, 49 La. Ann. 114, 21 So. 179 (1896).
10. Aucoin v. Dunn, 255 La. 823, 233 So. 2d 530 (1970); Petition of Sewerage &
Water Bd., 248 La. 169, 177 So. 2d 276 (1965); Hirt v. City of New Orleans, 225 La.
589, 73 So. 2d 471 (1954); Pettingill v. Hills, Inc., 199 La. 557, 6 So. 2d 660 (1942); In
re Westwego Moss Co., 196 La. 168, 198 So. 893 (1940).
11. La. Const. art. VII, § 3 (1921) provided: "No function shall ever be attached
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The courts further recognized that even if sufficient adverseness
existed and a genuine controversy was present, the issue might still
be non-justiciable if it involved a political question, i.e., a matter
which should be resolved by the executive" or legislative 3 branch of
government. Conversely, the courts required that neither of the co-
ordinate branches of government be allowed to encroach upon mat-
ters of judicial prerogative." The 1921 constitution provided that
courts could perform only judicial functions,"' and pursuant to this
mandate, Louisiana courts had invalidated statutes authorizing
judges to perform duties of a non-judicial nature.'
In the instant case, the Louisiana supreme court concluded that
the procedure authorized by the trust code provision effectively
placed before the court a civil matter appropriate for judicial resolu-
tion and sufficiently non-political to satisfy the requisites of justicia-
bility. 7 In considering the validity of the trust code provision, the
to any court of record, or to judges thereof, except such as are judicial .... " Section
35 of the same article provided that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in
all civil matters regardless of the amount in dispute." The courts traditionally read
the provisions as requiring the existence of a dispute, in the sense that adverse parties
with opposing claims ripe for judicial determination were considered essential to the
courts' exercise of general jurisdiction. See Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n
v. State, 295 So. 2d 796 (La. 1974); State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So.
2d 597 (1955).
Whether article VII, § 35 actually required a "dispute" in such a traditional sense
is a matter of constitutional interpretation. The provision could have been construed
to extend jurisdiction to all civil matters with the phrase "regardless of the amount in
dispute" being interpreted, not as mandating a dispute in civil matters, but merely
as a specification that no minimum jurisdictional amount was to be imposed.
12. See Nicholson v. Thompson, 5 Rob. 367 (La. 1843), where the court deter-
mined that it was in the discretion of the governor, not the courts, to determine who
to appoint to the offices of Master and Warden of the Port of New Orleans.
13. See Staring v. Grace, 97 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) declaring that if
the statute in question was constitutional, the courts could not refuse to apply it
merely because application in the instant case appeared harsh. .. he court stressed that
only the legislature had the authority to decide which laws were most desirable or
equitable. Id. at 674.
14. See Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. United Mine Workers, 227 La. 1109, 81 So.
2d 413 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Ex parte Steckler, 179 La.
410, 154 So. 41 (1934), appeal dismissed, 292 U.S. 610 (1934); State ex rel. Parish Bd.
of Health v. Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish, 161 La. 1, 108 So. 104 (1926).
15. La. Const. art. VII, § 3 (1921), cited at note 11, supra.
16. See State ex rel. O'Donnell v. Houston, 40 La. Ann. 598, 4 So. 482 (1888)
declaring a statute authorizing judges to act in the capacity of commissioners unconsti-
tutional under article 92 of the 1879 constitution. See also In re Southern Cotton Oil
Co., 148 La. 69, 86 So. 656 (1920).
17. In re Gulf Oxygen Welders' Supply Profit Sharing Plan and Trust Agreement,
297 So. 2d 633, 666 (La. 1974).
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court applied the principle of state constitutional interpretation that,
absent a particular constitutional prohibition limiting the legisla-
ture's power to act, legislative enactments may not be invalidated on
state constitutional grounds. 8 Since the majority found no constitu-
tional provision which barred trust suits of the nature authorized by
the statute, the provision was upheld."9
It seems clear, however, that In re Gulf did not raise a "genuine
controversy" as that concept had been previously interpreted."0 The
language of article VII, § 35 of the 1921 constitution which granted
original jurisdiction to district courts in civil matters "regardless of
the amount in dispute"'" had previously been seized upon by the
courts to impose the requirement that a dispute was essential to a
valid exercise of general state court jurisdiction." Embodied in this
general requirement was the notion that disputes could only be raised
by antagonistic parties in an adversary context. 3 However, In re Gulf,
rather than presenting two adverse parties seeking the resolution of
a genuine dispute, merely involved a trustee seeking the advice of the
court on how to administer a trust." Since there was no contest in-
volving adversary parties, and hence no real dispute, it would seem
that the court would have felt constrained to find a lack of jurisdic-
tion if it had applied the traditional rule.
Additionally, the provision of the trust code, by requiring the
judiciary to render advisory opinions, appears violative of article VII,
§ 3 of the 1921 constitution, which declared that courts are limited
to the performance of judicial functions.28 Compulsory rendition of
18. See, e.g., Kane v. Louisiana Comm'n Governmental Ethics, 250 La. 855, 199
So. 2d 900 (1967); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192 (1965); State v.
Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); State ex rel. Labauve v. Michel, 121
La. 374, 46 So. 430 (1908).
19. 297 So. 2d at 665. The court stated that there must be a reasonable doubt as
to the trustee's powers or duties before a suit may be instituted under the statute. Id.
at 667. However, it is unclear whether the court viewed a suit authorized by the statute
as a "dispute" within the meaning of article VII, § 35 of the 1921 constitution or
whether the court, dispensing with the dispute requirement, broadly interpreted the
constitutional provision as granting jurisdiction in all civil matters. The court did not
stress the existence of a "dispute" and under the traditional view none seemed to exist.
Perhaps the better view is that the majority has expansively read article VII, § 35 and
is willing to hear "all civil matters" which it considers justiciable. Id.
20. See cases cited at note 11, supra.
21. (Emphasis added.) See text of constitutional provision at note 11, supra.
22. See, e.g., State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So. 2d 597 (1956);
Baddock v. Louisiana State Dep't of Hwys., 142 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
23. See, e.g., Petition of Sewerage and Water Bd., 248 La. 169, 177 So. 2d 276
(1965); State v. Board of Supervisors, 228 La. 951, 84 So. 2d 597 (1955).
24. 297 So. 2d at 664.
25. See text of constitutional provision at note 11, supra.
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advisory opinions may disorient the power division between the legis-
lative and judicial branches and may invade the political realm of the
legal process. Making law is the responsibility of the legislature, not
the courts. The statute tends to blur the distinction and thrusts the
courts into the role of lawmakers instead of guardians of the law.
In re Gulf thus appears to abandon the traditional requirements
of justiciability which had barred rendition of advisory opinions. The
majority opinion does not indicate the precise limits of the legisla-
ture's authority to extend court jurisdiction by statute, but its analy-
sis suggests that any limitation must be at least implicit in the consti-
tution. This approach has disturbing implications. Could the legisla-
ture, for example, require the court to determine the constitutionality
of every statute passed by it in yearly session?"6 Such a result would
certainly unduly enlarge the powers of the judiciary.
The majority in In re Gulf, however, appears to recognize that
there should be limitations on the legislature's authority to expand
judicial power. After finding the trust code provision constitutional,
the court examined its purpose and observed that it was not intended
to extend jurisdiction "to questions which may never arise or which
may arise in the future but have not yet arisen, or as to matters
resting within his [the trustee's] discretion." 7 Presumably the court
would not have further examined the statutory provision if it had
believed that all legislative requests for advisory opinions should be
honored.
In re Gulf is probably best viewed in light of the 1974 constitu-
tion, which went into effect six months after the decision was ren-
dered.2" The new constitution omits the phrase, "regardless of the
amount in dispute" and thus eliminates the possibility of the courts
interpreting the constitution as requiring a "dispute" as a condition
precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.n Also, no provision expressly
limits the role of the courts to performance of judicial functions2
Unhampered by the language of the 1921 constitution that led state
26. See Annot., 103 A.L.R. 1087 (1936) for a discussion of the power of state
legislatures, absent express constitutional provisions, to authorize or require courts to
render advisory opinions upon the request of the governor or of either house of the
legislature.
27. 297 So. 2d at 667.
28. In re Gulf was decided on July 1, 1974. The new constitution went into effect
at midnight December 31, 1974.
29. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 16 simply stating that: "Except as otherwise author-
ized by this constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and
criminal matters."
30. La. Const. art. VII, § 3 (1921) was not totally carried over into the 1974
constitution. But cf. LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 2 cited at note 32, infra.
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courts to interpret that document as limiting their jurisdiction, the
courts now appear to have new flexibility in determining the justicia-
bility of issues before them.3 However, it should be noted that the
new constitution contains language which could serve as a source of
constitutional limitation on the power of the courts, despite the ab-
sence of express prohibitions. The requirement that courts confine
their activities to performance of traditional judicial functions could
be implicitly derived from sections one and two of article H of the
1974 constitution which generally set out the division of power
among the three branches of government.2
Under the new constitution, it would appear that Louisiana
courts may no longer insist as a general requirement of jurisdiction
that issues be presented in an adversary contest. Still, under the
language of In re Gulf, the courts have retained the right to dismiss
such questions as "may never arise" or "which may arise only at some
future time."' ' Further, if the court is faced with a statute requiring
it to rule on a matter which it considers inappropriate for judicial
resolution, the court may rely on limitations implicit in the 1974
constitution to declare the act unconstitutional.
Ansel Martin Stroud III
CHILD CUSTODY: PATERNAL AUTHORITY V. WELFARE OF THE CHILD
During the existence of her marriage, Mrs. Wood filed a petition
for habeas corpus in district court to recover the custody of her two-
year-old daughter from the child's maternal grandparents. The court
awarded custody to the grandparents based on the "best interest" of
the child and its decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal. On writs to the Louisiana supreme court, plaintiff argued
that the district court was without jurisdiction to inquire into the
31. For instance, if a legislative body sought an advisory opinion, judges, following
the criterion laid down in the instant case, could refuse to answer on the ground that
the issue had not yet arisen, and was therefore not justiciable.
32. LA. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 & 2 provide: "The powers of government of the state
are divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Except
as otherwise provided by this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person
holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others."
These provisions might well be authority for continued limitation of the court's power
to the exercise of judicial functions, either as traditionally understood, or as re-defined
in In re Gulf.
33. 297 So. 2d at 667.
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